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The paper discusses the meaning of development administration 
suggesting that it is closer in meaning to political development than 
to traditional public administration. If then goes on to speculate 
on the adequacy of decentralis ation as a response to specific problem 
areas of development administration. The underlying argument is that 
decentralisation is not a panacea, father it must be accompanied by 
a high degree of political commitment from all concerned, and in this 
sense, it is .an issue in underdevelopment. 
Introduction 
Administration, has freouently been cited as one of the 
various, shortcomings of development policy in Kenya.- This 
shortcoming is by no means peculiar to Kenya. It is now generally 
recognised that developing countries must respond to underdevelopment 
with administrative structures that might have to be substantially 
different from those already established in developed countries if 
development is to take place. In other words, the fact that one is 
engaged in administering development projects does not mean that 
one is thereby engaged in development administration. The admini-
stration must must embrace features that make it developmental in 
its own right, regardless of the intrinsic nature of the activity 
that is being administered. This, of course is a statement of the 
problem in cLii Irea 1 form, for in nil likelihood organisational 
features do have an effect on the nature of the would-be development 
activity and vice-versa, 'and especially at the stage of implementation. 
In other words at a practical level, the independence between 
administrative features and the nature of the development activity 
is likely to break down, if it ever existed, due to mutual adaptation 
between the two. The prospect of mutual adaptation, however, cannot 
be interpretted as the case against an independent conception of 
development administration; no more than the latter can be interpretted 
as the case against an independent conception of a development 
activity. Failure to conceptually separate the two would likely lead 
to a situation where one logically follows from the other, whichever 
one happens to be empirically defined first. Thus, one would be 
empirically empty.2 
Our concern here, however, is not with the peculiar relationships 
between administrative features and a development activity. Rather, 
we are concerned with the ouestion of the relationship between 
development administration and decentralisation. More precisely, 
would like to speculate -around the Question; to what extent is 
decentralisation an adeouate response to the salient problems of 
1. 3ee Tor example: Ndeg^a Report on the Public Service. U.N. Ndegwa, 
Chairman M B Govt. Printer 1971« 
2. The Administration of the "Special Rural Development Programme" 
was in effect on attempt at our independent conception, albeit in a 
very narrow sense of development, administration. 
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development administration? For our present purpose, we would like to 
discuss four problem areas of development administration. These problem 
areas are, of course, not exhaustive. Indeed some might not even consider 
them the most important areas. They 'are therefore chosen purely as 
illustrations of the central issue vis, decentralisation as a response to 
development problems. The four problem areas ares 1. Utilisation of 
external resources in the context of institution building. 2. Innovation 
in administering development. 3® Administrative complexity in inducing 
development. 4. Speedy and decisive implementation of development projects. 
First, a few words on development administration as such. 
Development Administration 
. Like most other concepts, development administration is surrounded 
with debate, depending on whether one views it from the point of view of 
public administration or from the point of view of social-political development. 
Those who view it from the point of view of traditional public administration 
tend to put the emphasis on the notion of 'public". They therefore argue 
that development administration is that aspeet of public administration which 
is concerned with development activities, be they social or economic, i.e. so 
long as the activity concerned is both public and involves independently 
defined development projects, then the kind of administration involved is, 
ipso facto, development administration. In other words if one were charged 
with the responsibility of studying development administration, one would 
look for public development activities, however defined, and then study the 
administrative structures around it. Alternatively one would formulate 
administrative structures to go with the public development activities. In 
brief this school of thought would argue that public administration is a 
much broader concept than development administration. 
The question therefore becomess are we to assume that the aspect 
of public administration which is concerned with other than direct public 
development activities is itself developed, or are we to assume that even 
if it is not developed, it does not need development? If the assumption is 
that it is developed, then the additional question becomes? how come it has 
developed out of context when the rest of the system is not developed? How 
about such constant complaints that one hears about as the unwillingness of 
the public officials from newly independent countries to make 'decisions? 
Is*nt this .an aspect that needs development? How about the tendency to 
make .decisions•"in' that-interest of certain classes or even in the interests-of 
external classes? If on the other hand the assumption is that this aspect of 
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administration does not need development, then this clearly calls for an 
explanation. The point being made is that administration cannot be taken 
out of context from the general condition of underdevelopment, i.e.-.it must 
be viewed within the systemic context, which in this case is underdevelopment. 
Similar Questions to the ones asked above have led another school 
of thought to conceive development administration in a much broader way than 
public administration as understood in so-called developed countries. Infact 
some YTriters have conceived is so broadly as to make it eouivalent to 
nation — building, with all that this involves. Conceived this broadly,. 
development administration subsumes under it such other concepts as 
integration, political development, economic development, general institution 
building etc. 
According to this school", the emphasis is not so much on the notion 
of "public" as on the more ideologically commital idea of "development". 
Thus, everything including the management of public institutions that 
are far removed from development projects as such, falls under the category 
of development administration. £n other "rords, it is assumed that 
development should be predicated on the whole system .and not. simply on an 
aspect of the system that is arbitrarily designated as developmental. As 
As can be seen this amounts to a virtual abolition of the notion of public 
administration replacing it with the more comprehensive idea of development 
2 
administration. One of the advantages of this conception of development 
administration is that it makes it easier to introduce radical changes in 
the whole system, and to do so in a comprehensive integrating manner. In 
other words, once we have done away with the assumption that one sector 
of the system is already functioning the way it should, then it becomes 
logically possible to plan comprehensively taking into account systemic 
adjustments and anticipated systemic consequences. Thus if the ideological 
commitment is to decentralise in order to facilitate participation by the 
non - official public, then the neccessary institutional re-organisation 
would include public administration if the latter was a hindrance by 
virtue of the fact that it embodies a non - developmental - . : 
1. See for example; M.J. IDs man "The Politics of Development. 
Administration" in. J.r. Montgomery and IT.J. S if fin (TDds) Approaches to 
Development Administration and Change. N.I. 1966. 
2. Tanzania has .already done this. 
ideology."*" We can no-r see why, development administration, conceived this 
way is closer to political development than to traditional public 
administration that is supposed to be politically non committed. 
Whatever conception of development administration one chooses 
to employ there seems to be agreement that the goal of development 
administration is economic and social development and that this involves 2 
planning. The latter is supposed to make the whole process rational. 
How much planning, for what sector and at what level of government is part 
of the debate. This debate notwithstanding, there seems to be agreement 
that change must be induced in all sectors of the society "including 3 
change in peoples attitudes and behaviour. In other words, social 
development as an intermediate goal of development administration should 
not be considered separately from economic development. It "must be 
considered paripassu with economic development". Further, and perhaps 
more important, a condition of scarcity must be a built - in premise of 
the process of planning. '.That is to say the scope of the activity is not. 
enough to distinguish development administration from traditional public 
administration. ' The environment of scarcity is in many ways an important 
distinguishing criterion. 
f 
Given the premise of scarcity, the necessity for both economic 
and social development and the broad conception of development administration 
we shall briefly look at the four problem areas of development administration 
mentioned above. 
It is generally agreed that economic growth could take place 
4 
without engineered social change, but not self-sustaining and integrated 
development. The latter requires planning that conceives of development as 
a complex whole "comprising economic elements, sensu stricto," but also quantifiable 
and most important, not so easily / elements such as' illiteracy, social 
inequalities etc. What is the place of imported resources in this process? 
lo See Ahmed Mohdin "Ideological Inertia and Development Planning 
paper presented, at the workshop on Interdisciplinary \ppi-oaches to 
Development Planning Khartoum, Nov. 1975. 
2. J.D. Montgomery. "A Royal Invitation. Variations on three classic 
themes". Esman and Montgomery Ibid. . . 
3. D.C. store "Guidlines for Training Development Administrators" 
Joynal of administration Overseas Vol. V 1966. 
see. "Social Policy and Planning in National Development" Inter-
national Social Development J^g^Jgn. 3C u.'I.P. 6 * 
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It might be argued that if the choice is simple economic growth, 
then there is a clear and positive place for imported resources. It might 
even be further argued that importation of development resources constitutes 
a bold recognition of scarcity in the particular administrative system and 
is therefore justifiable given the central role of scarcity. However, a 
number of counter arguments can also be made. The first argument is a 
straightforward empirical fact viz;, that the choice is rarely simple economic 
growth, if one uses as the criterion the Quantity of resources that is 
usually allocated to social development in planning.-1- The problem therefore 
is one of quality. The second argument is really a question for consideration 
in planning vis. on what system should scarcity be predicated, the local 
system, the national system, or the international system? The answer seems 
to depend on the anticipated consequences. In most cases the practice has 
been to predicate scarcity on both the local and the national .systems, while 
assuming expanding resources in the international system. Hence the constant 
search for external assistance in its various forms. Given that the choice 
at least in practice, is rarely simple economic growth, '.-hat then are some 
of the likely consequences of external resources on integrated and self-
sustaining development? 
Integrated and self - sustaining development requires, among 
0 
others two major elements, via stable resources and stable institutions. 
Imported resources are always subject to stochastic influences be they 
political or economic. They are non - guaranteable and therefore by nature 
unstable. T?ven when they are ouantitatively guaranteable, they are subject 
to qualitative change. Given this nature of external resources, it becomes 
possible to argue that the consequences of their utilisation on self-
sustaining development are not necessarily favourable, since the function 
which these resources are best at performing viz economic growth, is 
.U Ibid 
2. See Marshall Wolfe. "Between the Idea and the reality; Notes 
on Plan Implementation" Ibid pp. 324 
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is subjected to fluctuations beyond the control of the planner. 
As far as institutional stability is concerned, there seems to be 
two interrelated aspects to the problem, -the first aspect concerns what is 
to be institutionalised. This is logically prior to institutional stability 
for in most cases challenges or non - challenges to institutions depand very 
much on what has been institutionalised, Self - evidently, almost anything 
can be institutionalised depending of course on other factors in the system. 
Thus, depending on the availability of coercive forces fear can be 
institutionalised as in the Leviathon state. In order to reduce the likelihood, 
of challenges to the institutions, the latter must embrace broadly accepted and 
easily understandable procedures. In other words, local participation is of 
central importance. Participation in both planning and implementation gives 
the people who are supposed to be beneficiories of development an avenue 
for articulation. This increases the likelihood of response from the upper 
echelons of administration since governments "tend to respond only if there 
is a clear evidence of demand". Further, ••'•hen there is an avenue for local 
participation, it becomes no longer necessary to try' and discover the 
so-called indigeneous institutions. Instead, development administration 
becomes a process of creating the institutions as the people articulate the 
values that need to be institutionalised. These values cannot be assured 
to be unchanging and hence the futility of looking for indigeneous institutions, 
and correspondily, the importance of administrative innovation. 
The implications ,as far as utilisation of external.resources is 
concerned are obvious. In addition to the obvious danger of superimposition, 
there is the prior danger of institutionalisation not taking place at all in 
the first place, especially when the would-be models become too identified 
with and dependent on non-ind.egenous persons or groups. Thus the answer to 
our original question is at best ambiguous. In order to avoid the unfavourable 
consequences of utilising external resources, the latt.er. .must, be. integrated 
in national development. ' This is easier said than done, for it involves 
deciding which internal non - economic prerequisite's are substitutable by 
external financial/economic resources and which -are not, and the pertinent 
substitution functions and methods;. A difficult task to say the least} 
1 International Social Development Review op cit-p. 6. 
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2. Innovative behaviour can be seen in contrast to incremental reforms 
designed to improve, for example" operational efficiency or simply 
horizontal coordination. In other words, it is not simply modernizing 
the bureaucracy. It is this, plus the ability to create new institutions 
designed to further development objectives. In the specific context of 
planning, the conflict over innovation is usually between the planning 
units and the finance units representing innovative tendencies and. 
2 
conservative tendencies respectively. ' Now it might be argued that the 
conservative tendencies of the finance divisions represent a clear recognition 
of scarce resources and are therefore justifiable. This argument is true, 
but only partly so. In this particular context it is necessary to raise 
the questions scarce for whom? In other words we cannot legitimately assume 
that the budgetary process is a cost/benefit approach resulting in an 
overall rational action in the distribution of resources. In most cases, the 
budgetary process "reflects influence and power struggles rather than 
deliberate cost/benefit approach".3 Hence the relevance of the question. 
Planning on the other hand involves choosing from alternative courses of 
action "on the basis of a preliminary diagnosis covering relevant factors". 
It is true that one of the major planning problems in developing countries 
is the so - called "planning "dthout facts" but in all likelihood the 
planning process is a much more rational activity than the budgetary process. 
Given the previous discussion on the need for development administration to 
keep pace with rapidly changing societal attitudes as a prerequisite for 
stable institutions, then the policv euestion is whether the general tendency 
of finance divisions to dominate planning divisions should not be reversed 
giving more priority to innovation as opposed to financial security. The 
latter, in any case cannot apply to all, given the scarcity of resources 
and the struggle for influence that this scarcity necessitates. 
3. Administrative complexity can be viewed in the contexts of scarce 
resources and the need for local participation. Few people would deny 
the need for expertise especially where programmes of economic development 
1. For the concept of bureaucratic innovation see Victor Thomson "Idmini-
strative Objectives for Development Administration" Administrative Science 
Quarterly V (2) June 1969. p. 91. 
2. Social Policy and Planning in National Development" Op cit pn 6-7. 
3. Ibid 
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are involved. However, as we have seen, economic development should 
only be one aspect of development. The broad question, therefore, as far 
as manpower planning is concerned is 5 to what extent should development . 
administration be manned by experts either indigeneous or external? Again 
the answer depends on the anticipated consequences. It can be argued 
that specialisation is likely to improve staff performance^ True. However, 
this argument is premised on a sectoral conception of development be it 
economic or social. Within the concept of integrated and self-sustaining • 
development, the utilisation of experts could have two major consequences 
both of which are undesirable. 
o 
JC 
First, the administration is likely to become financially burdened:, 
tJThe more institutional expertise is required, the higher the cost. For 
example at the project level highly sophisticated evaluation procedures 
are totally unsuitable for individual small projects if for no other 
reason than because their high level manpower and financial costs rival 
or exceed those of the projects themselves"3 
Second, and perhaps more important, specialisation has a tendency 
to lead to complexity and herein lies the other problem. Given the 
conditions in the least developed countries it is unlikely that 
specialised administrators would be uniformly distributed throughout the 
system. The likely result is that the centre would be characterised by 
complexity and the periphery would be composed of a few highly specialised 
administrators charged with the responsibility of explaining and overseeing 
the implements, bion. In this situation communication between the experts 
is possible but not between the experts and the people, unless a host of 
intermediate staff is available for the purpose of simplifying and 
explaining the policy. This host of staff is usually not available. 
1. See Guv Hunter. "Development Administration in Fast Africa5? Journal of 
Administration Overseas. Vol IV 1966. pp., 8-9 c 
2. .. Ibid. ,„• 
3. Reginald Herbold Green, "The Hole of the state as an Agent of Economic 
and Social Development in the least Developed Countries" Journal of 
Development Planning. NO. 6. U.N. NoY. 1974 P« 17 
— Q — IDS/TP 257 
The point here is that local participation, which is a prerequisite for 
stable institutions could, easily be negated hy administrative complexity. 
Lack of participation could in turn mean lack of enthusiasm and in some 
cases outright non - cooperation in development efforts. The policy choice 
here seems to be between sectoral efficiency utilising specialised 
administrators and a simple administrative system that puts a premium on 
local input and motivating people, and at the same time utilising local 
resources and thus coming into terms with the constraint of scarce resources. 
The latter choice might requre no more than simple administrative guidlines" 
that may be applied by semi - skilled manpower rapidly and with a fair 
probability of a correct decision. (This approach) might be a much more 
hopeful way of making the right allocations in the short run and of 
building broadly based institutional and decision - making capacity in the 
medium and long run"."1" 
4. Given the atmosphere of "'rising expectations", decisive and speedy 
implementation becomes a vital factor in development administration. Any 
one of a number of factors could account for slow or for that matter 
non — implementation. Some of these factors, for example instability of 
resources and instability of institutions have already been mentioned. In 
addition to these factors, implementation could be affected by a "lack 
of authentic national development policies, incorporating images of future 
society towards which the striving for development is directed." In other 
words a development ideology. In some extreme cases, the plan might be 
intended solely to get aid, without any intention of ever implementing it.™ 
Also often mentioned is the fact that the relevant data might be non -
available. This last factor is not very convincing, for it follows 
that if there is no data for implementation, there ought not to have been 
data for the plan in the first place. Whatever, the relevant factors are 
at any one time and place, the problem of :;peedy implementation should be 
o. 
considered in the context of quality decisions.^ More often than not, this 
constitutes a dilemma, which cannot be resolved by changes in administrative 
structures without opting for either speed or quality. More on this will 
be said in the context of decentralisation. 
1. Reginald Herbold Greene. Op cit ?. 7 
2. Marshall Wolfe op.cit pp. 32-34o 
3 . See Guy Hunter op.cit. p. 7. 
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De centr alis ationi 
Decentralisation is not intrinsic to any type of administration 
be it developing or developed. It is a conscious choice that has to be 
justified either on the basis of faith or on the rational grounds of it 
being the best alternative given particular goals. In general terms 
decentralisation has been justified mainly in the name of "grass - roots 
democracy". The .-argument usually put forward is that institutional and 
political decentralisation would facilitate•local participation in planning 
•and this would in turn enhance distribution, access to national resources 
and the general feeling of democratic participation.-'- Thus decentralisation 
is viewed as both on administrative and a political concept. This, however, 
! 
does not mean that the administrative and the political elements must 
always operate jointly and in equal strength. It is possible to have 
bureaucratic decentralisation with more or less political decentralisation 
•and vice versa. In some cases it is possible for one form of decentralisation 
2 
to be effected without the other. The special Rural Development Programme 
is a good example of some form of bureaucrate decentralisation, without 
political decentralisation, through the mechanism of centralising financial 
powers. 
I ; 
Within the context of development administration, decentralisation 
has been justified in the name of giving power to the people,^ complexity 
of local conditions, speedy implementation and in some cases on the basis 
of the particular administrative history. Our present concern, however, 
is not the justification of decentralisation as such. Rather we are 
concerned with decentralisation as a response to the major issues of 
development administration discussed above. lfe shall look at 1. scarce 
resources. 2. Institutional stability 3 . Innovation and complexity 
j k. Decesive implementation. 
I. The relationship /^^decentralisation / scarce resources is 
by no means obvious. The major argument is that decentralisation 
would facilitate a more effective utilisation of local resources 
since local conditions would be taken into account during planning 
and consequently during implementation. This argument is based on a 
1. See Ouma Oyugi "Participation in Development Planning at the 
Local Level" Institute for Development Studies. University of Nairobi. 
Discussion Paper. 163 
2. For a more detailed discussion see. A.- T» Rweyemamu and BJJ. Mwansasu 
(Eds) j Planning in Tanzania; Background, to decentralisation. EARS - PP 111-130, 
3 . Ibid. p. 122. 
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recognition of scarcity at the national level and says little or nothing 
about the international system,, This seems to have been the logic behind 
S?J)P where the necessity for small - scale prototype testing was recognised, 
utilising "existing Kenyan resources both for development purposes and 
research purposes, and" without a vast infusion of external aid." ^  The 
ambiguity about the international level notT.dthstanding, several comments 
can be made in relation to the national level. 
First, the effectiveness of decentralisation might very well depend 
on the degree of decentralisation. Ilhat is <:local" to the central 
administrator might not be so to a peasant. For example, the choice of the 
District as the administrative unit cannot be justified logically. The 
District might not be local enough for some. Secondly, the effectiveness 
could depend on what aspects have been decentralised, find to -whom. For 
example planning could be decentralised to the District level, and 
implementation to the Divisional level. This could be compounded by 
centralising the financial powers as in GRDP. The result could be 
disharmony between the plan and implementation, delays in implementation, 
and frustration on the part of the implemeters due to their inability to 
make any definite commitments in the absence of financial powers. Thirdly, 
the question needs to be asked; how do the local resources fit in the 
national context of development? This is the dilemma of decentralisation 
within the context of disintegrating forces such as (unequal endox-nment of 
resources between regions and peoples. In order to avoid institutionalising 
inequalities through decentralisation, the latter might have to be incomplete, 
taking the form of bureaucratic decentralisation without political 
decentralisation. Even this mechanism leaves a host of other questions 
unanswered such as the level of decentralisation. 
2. There does not seem to be any logical or direct link between 
decentralisation and institutional stability. There can be an indirect 
link, however, through participation. A case can be made that decentrali-
sation is likely to lead to increased participation at the local level, 
which in turn is likely to lead to institutionalisation of broadly accepted 
1. See An Overall Evaluation of the .Special Rural Development Programme. 
Institute for Development Studies. University of Nairobi. Occasional Paper 
No, 8 pp. Xii - Xiii 1972. 
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values, which in turn would lead to institutional stability. One must 
admit that this argument rests on a rather long inferential chain, ' • 
and any one of a number of things could happen in between. In recognition 
of this fact the discussion usually centres on participation and its relation 
to stability. First it has been argued that participation is more likely to 
lead to instability because of excessive demands. Hence, in keeping with 
scarce resorces, the argument continues, participants should be just those 
who are "willing and able to meet production goals*'. Others should be 
excluded to avoid having the agencies strategy nullified by popular demands". 
The second argument usually put forward is that, at this stage of development, 
people cannot participate because they do not have the capacity to partici— 
pate." Thirdly, and with specific reference to decentralisation, it is argued 
that participation can take place without decentralisation. Hence, the goal 
of stability can be achieved without decentralisation. This is the 
"extractionist" view of participation whereby "the central government 
intervenes in an attempt to promote maximal utilization of scarce local 
resources." The local people are involved in planning "as potential 
contributors of money ?nd labour and not as potential members of a strong 
social/political/economic unit. 3 
The three arguments seem to be premised on the growth concept of 
development find as such are only true within this narrower concept of 
development. Outside this narrow concept of development, the arguments 
have serious loopholes and one can legitimately argue that they .are anti-
developmental. The first two argument seems to assume that ability and 
willingness are inmate characteristics. If one utilises the broad conception 
of development, then it becomes obvious that ability and willingness are 
\ issues in underdevelopment. In other words within the broad conception of 
\ development, decentralisation as a response should aim precisely at creating 
\among other things ability and willingness to participate once it is clear 
'jbo the people what they want, as opposed to what is determined for them by 
the rulersol icd :"..'« Furthermore, these arguments assume a benevolent 
\ ' " See' for example S. Chard. District Government and -Economic Development 
in Kenyas tUcrofilmi. \nn Arbor Mich. 1970 p. '313'. . ~ 
{ W* Ouma Oyugi Op Git pp... 12-15 
3* V Ibid p. 2 
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participant who Td.ll out of sheer good will distribute the fruits of his 
participation to the so—called unwilling -and unable non - participants. 
This obviously is not the case. Ability and willingness to participate 
are accuired traits, and what is even more important they are vital 
determinants of access to the final product. They should however not be 
regarded as absolute determinants for in a sense they are also the results 
of access to the scarce resources. Given this circular relationship 
decentralisation would be meaningless if it does not lead to either one or 
the other. Hopefully it would lead to better access to' resources which 
would in turn lead to ability and willingness to participate. It is in 
this sense that decentralisation is an issue in underdevelopment. 
With reference to the "extractionist" view of participation, 
one can either deny that this is participation, or one can argue that the 
view puts a premium on stability as an end state which is almost self-
determining, as opposed to the process of institutionalising broadly accepted 
values, as a determinant of stability. The process demands much more than ' 
simple extraction. 
3. The cuestion of innovative behaviour can be discussed together 
with the related problem of administrative complexity. There seem to be 
two major views to this Question. The first view is pessimistic and looks at 
the problem of non - innovativeness in terms of "ecological" factors. These 
factors include culture and relevant historical facts.^ This view is 
pessimistic because the conclusion is usually that institutional changes 
would be fruitless since the administrative practices .are the result of 
social and cultural conditions. In other words, non - innovativeness is 
9 
the result of inability to become innovative. It follows from this 
conclusion that structural changes would have little if any effect at all. 
In fact nothing short of revolutionary changes including major cultural 
re-orientations aould have any effect. 
1. See for example R.S. i&lne. "Mechanistic and Organic Models of 
Public Administration in Developing Countries" Administrative Science Quarterly 
IX (2) March 1970 PP. 62-63. 
2. J.E. Nellis. "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?" Institute 
for Development Studies; University of Nairobi Staff Paper No. 103. 1971, 
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The second -view is less pessimistic. According to this view, 
specialisation and the resultant administrative complexity might have . :• 
something to do with non—innovativeness. 
" the essence of bureaucratic administration is to have highly 
specialised and defined areas of jurisdiction within which the 
bureaucratic can apply the rules ... appropriate to that area. But the 
essence of development is the need to secure interrelated changes 
in a whole range of sectors of life simultaneously; for this the 
breakdown of the whole problem of development in any area into rigidly 
separated jurisdictions is on obstacle, not -an advantage." 
It seems to follow from this view that if an effort is made to avoid top 
heavy idministrative systems, through such techniques as devolution and 
decentralisation, then more innovative behaviour might follow, though 
it is not ouite clear how and why. Of course it ..is possible to argue that 
innovativeness will be a result of response to demands and changing attitudes 
now that the system is able to monitor them better. Be that as it may, one 
should point out. that the centre relations, say between finance and planning 
units, could still hold, only now at a different level. Decentralisation 
is no guarantee that these relations will change. 
The two views., I think, fail to address themselves to the Question; 
2 
why should, innovation take place? They tell us why innovation Hoes not 
take place.. They do "not- tell us in what conditions it might take place. 
If one looks at the problem from a materialist point of view, then it 
becomes possible to argue that in this context innovativeness, is a result 
of access to resources. In this sense, if decentralisation creates access 
to resources by the people, then this condition will--force bureucratic 
innovativeness, as a response to the demands. 
/+. Decisive implementation recuires among other things high speed 
decisions. In the context of scarce resources, however, the choice must be 
made between ouick decisions and high Duality decisions. To achieve both 
1. Colin Leys "Recruitment, Promotion and. Training" Ot in jfcv. Nellis 
Ibid. P 9. 
2. John Nellis Ibid. 
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speed ana quality requires a high calibre of junior staff and this is hardly 
to be expected in a situation characterised by scarce resources.1 
Decentralisation should in principle facilitate quick decisions 
though this should not be taken to mean that the decisions taken in a 
decentralized structure are therefore automatically poor. The choice 
between speed and.ouality need not be absolute in charactero In the 
specific context of project administration, it is possible to make 
administrative arrangements so that the knowledge of the highly qualified 
staff at the centre is utilised during implementation and the experience 
of the field staff is fed back to the policy-makers. 
Decentralisation, however, should not be regarded as an 
automatic guarantee for decisive implementation, certainly no more than 
it is an absolute choice between the latter and high quality implementation. 
As we have already seen, a host of other factors might affect implementation 
in one way or the other. One factor which perhaps needs emphasis is the 
temperament of the senior decision makers. The effects of a non — 
quantifiable factor like this are perhaps more difficult to gauge than, say, 
the effects of resource instability. The most that could be said if 
decisive implementation is to take place, then the senior policy — makers 
must be prepared to tolerate the necessary mistakes by the junior, less 
qualified staff. In other words, a resilient temperament is necessary 
if decentralisation is to have the desired results with a minimum of 
disharmony between the overall policy and implementation. Inflexity 
r\ t t 
and control run counter "to leadership, teamwork and initiative"^ which are 
classical concerns of development administration. 
1. For a fuller discussion see Guy Hunter op cit pp. 7-S« 
2. Ibid p. 9 
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Conclusion. 
The burden of the paper is a plea to view development in a much 
more comprehensive way. A non—sectoral view of development would show 
that decentralisation is no panacea. Choices have to be made, and trade-
offs must be carefully considered before making the choices. In an 
atmosphere of underdevelopment, these choices -are economic, political 
social and administrative. In other words, they transcend any one sector. 
The challenge is to avoid making choices that are in effect half - measures 
and consequently self defeating in the long run. 
•Secondly, decentralisation cannot even begin to solve some of 
the problems of development administration unless it is accompanied by 
a high degree of political commitment both at the centre and in the 
periphery. There are perhaps as many reasons to decentralise as there are 
to centralize. If the former is to achieve the goals In '•.•hose name it 
is normally justified, then it must first and foremost cater for access 
to resources and the others would probably follow. Given the tendency of 
the centre classes to jealously guard the resources for utilisation at the 
centre, one wonders whether decentralisation can be meaningful without a 
political"commitment to the creation of a society without major class 
differences. 
